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"Favoritism based on nationality will disappear. Favoritism based 
on individual worth and qualifications will take its place."l 
INTRODUCTION 
Today at this Symposium focused on civil rights at a critical junc-
ture, I am interested in examining the ways in which immigration re-
form itself mirrors critical challenges to civil rights happening beyond 
the field of immigration .. Senator Kennedy's quote, above, from 1965 
demonstrates both the explicit civil rights character of the 1965 immi-
gration law that reshaped America, and also the optimism that proved 
to be overstated in the intervening decades, as the factors determining 
"individual worth and qualifications" too often became proxies for 
race in ways that are deeply familiar to this audience. The criteria for 
worthiness that dominate today's rhetoric of reform are, I argue, race-
blind in name only, and I will show this by focusing on the bill that the 
Senate passed with bipartisan support in 2013,2 which remains the 
most complete articulation of the state of political agreement on the 
role of immigrants, present and future. Finally, as I consider how wor-
thiness and utility have supplanted-legally and rhetorically-the ex-
plicit goals of the 1965 law, I want to connect that shift to comparable 
issues facing communities of color more generally, for immigrants and 
citizens alike. 
Questions of worthiness permeate immigration law, and they 
arise in different ways: how to define it, where to look for it, whether 
and when it is an appropriate guide for decision-making. While al-
ways present in immigration law's history, worthiness has become an 
increasingly powerful concept and sorting device within immigration 
law, and provides a sharp, and I believe problematic, counterpoint to 
the egalitarianism envisioned by the civil rights era 1965 immigration 
law. Our immigration laws (both current and proposed) provide nar-
rower and narrower openings for legal immigration, seeking only the 
"best and the brightest," and will likely deploy a host of criteria from 
minor criminal issues to uneven employment histories to keep legali-
zation out of reach for the millions presently here without status. And 
as that same undocumented population is largely comprised of people 
of color, the issues of economic marginalization, over-policing and 
1. 111 CONGo REC. 24226 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). 
2. S. 744, 113th Congo (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Senate Bill]. 
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mass incarceration that affect people of color throughout society, nar-
row the possibilities for legalization even further. 3 
Race, worthiness, and immigration intersect in specific and pow-
erful ways in contemporary immigration policy debates. The Senate 
Bill, as shown in far greater detail in Section II below, reveals this 
dramatically.4 For future flows of immigrants, the bill elevates the 
highly skilled more explicitly than ever before, and for the present 
population of roughly eleven million undocumented immigrants, the 
bill legalizes only the hardest-working, most financially stable, and 
best educated among them. The multiple requirements to qualify for 
legalization create a composite of who is most worthy of more perma-
nent membership in the U.S., and through these requirements, the bill 
excludes millions of the eleven million. It imposes criteria of worthi-
ness at the expense of more completely addressing the problematic 
situation of the eleven million people, mostly people of color, living in 
our community without immigration status. 
I am not speaking today about how the immigrant rights move-
ment is a modern-day civil rights movement. Others have explored 
that idea-and its limitations-thoughtfully and thoroughly already.5 
Instead, I want to connect the shifts away from diversity and inclusion 
in the immigration context to similar shifts happening beyond the field 
of immigration. As critical race scholar Kevin Johnson, Dean of the 
University of California at Davis, has said, immigration law is a "help-
3. In my earlier writings, I have explored how immigration law and practice is slowly nar-
rowing the ways in which people, especially poor people and immigrants of color, can become 
"American." In one article, I showed how our binary stories about worthy and unworthy immi-
grants limit legal remedies available to immigrants in court. Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and 
Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 207 (2012) [hereinafter Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners). I noted how some 
of those stories intersect with stories about race and overly tie our hands as advocates for immi-
grants. Id. More recently, I looked at how claims to being American by immigrants brought to 
America as children (the "DREAMers") rest upon their worthiness of citizenship and how such 
a claim may create significant problems for other immigrants and for citizens alike-particularly 
for economically and racially marginalized communities. Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: 
The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, NEV. L. J. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Keyes, Defining American). The DREAMers' path to belonging, where they are seen as 
deserving the rights of membership in U.S. society, increasingly requires a high level of "worthi-
ness"; in that earlier article, I argued that the worthiness framework echoed the treatment of 
African Americans in issues from welfare reform in the 1990s up through current-day issues like 
voter identification laws and felon disenfranchisement. Id. 
4. S. 744, 113th Congo For a full discussion of the Senate Bill, see Part II, infra. 
5. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and the Civil Rights Agenda, 6 STAN. J. 
c.R. & c.L. 125, 126 (2010) (arguing that the conceptualization of immigration reform should be 
expanded beyond the civil rights framework). 
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ful gauge for measuring the nation's racial sensibilities."6 Johnson 
powerfully conceives that the ways America judges its prospective citi-
zens form a "magic mirror" for understanding how America treats-
or wishes to treat-citizens of color. I believe Johnson's "magic mir-
ror" is still a useful way of understanding immigration policy, and un-
derstanding America. I hope that by bringing that perspective to 
today's Symposium, I can offer immigration reform as an example of 
yet another critical juncture in civil rights. 
To draw these strands together, I first set out a very brief history 
of changing immigration laws in Part I, paying special note to how the 
1965 Act reversed decades of often explicit, egregious racial discrimi-
nation found in U.S. immigration law. This section also looks at the 
de facto erosion of the 1965 Act's egalitarian goals, as subsequent laws 
and immigration enforcement permitted discrimination to flourish 
amid, in particular although not exclusively, the undocumented popu-
lation. In Part II, I assess the present attempt at reform, looking at 
the qualities of immigrants being welcomed under the Senate Bill, and 
the characteristics of those who will be excluded from reform, a group 
that can be called, in Michael Wishnie's phrasing, the "super-undocu-
mented."7 Finally, I conclude by turning to the costs I see in the cur-
rent approach to reform, and I offer a view that as the reform focuses 
on documentation, as it potentially deepens troubling narratives about 
the undocumented population, and as it continues to move away from 
ideas of redemption and mercy, it mirrors civil rights challenges far 
beyond the issue of immigration itself. 
I. THE SHIFTING HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
IMMIGRATION RHETORIC 
A. Complicated Early Immigration History 
To make the case that immigration reform today marks a signifi-
cant break from past immigration policy, I want to briefly situate re-
form in the broader history of U.S. immigration policy. Widely 
perceived as being "a nation of immigrants," and a country proud of 
the Statue of Liberty's welcome to the world's tired and poor, the his-
tory is considerably less welcoming than the mythology suggests. It is 
6. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic 
Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1148 (1998). 
7. ALBA Roundtable on Immigration Reform: What Can Be Done, THE VOLUNTEER 
(June 15, 2013), http://www.albavolunteer.org/2013/06/alba-roundtable-on-immigration-reforml. 
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impossible to do justice to this subject in broad strokes, and others 
have thoughtfully and thoroughly explored it.s Here, I will look 
briefly at three periods: from the founding through the 1880s when the 
Supreme Court recognized a federal immigration power, the explicitly 
racialized period from the 1880s through 1965 when racial restrictions 
were lifted as part of the civil rights movement, and the erosion of that 
civil rights high-water point between 1965 and today. 
1. Founding Through 1880s 
For the first hundred years of the United States' existence, from 
the late eighteenth to late nineteenth century, the federal and state 
governments had largely unregulated stances toward immigration. 
The major exception, so morally and numerically significant as to 
hardly be an exception at all, was the forced migration of Africans as 
slaves, a practice that existed lawfully until 1808.9 Africans and their 
descendants suffered the highest, most formal levels of exclusion from 
membership in the U.S. During this period, Africans and their de-
scendants were denied anything approaching full membership, and 
even when free, were subject to the prospect of re-enslavement upon 
crossing state borders, a practice found constitutional in the infamous 
Dred Scott decision,lO and lately brought to vivid life in the film 12 
Years a SlaveY 
Other immigrants were welcome, provided they had the means to 
travel to the U.S. Individual states put up barriers that applied 
equally to individuals migrating from other countries as from other 
8. Scholars from law and history, alike, have examined this subject with great insight. See, 
e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS rN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 3-14 (2006); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECfS: ILLE-
GAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 1-14 (2004); Johnson, supra note 6, at 
1119-48; Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 572-75,600 
(2007). 
9. The Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807, 2 Stat. 426 (1807). The Act took 
effect in 1808, which, under the Constitution, was the first year that Congress could enact legisla-
tion regulating the slave trade. U.S. CONST., Art I, § 9 ("The Migration or Importation of such 
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by 
the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight."). 
10. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396 (1856). 
11. 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Regency Enterprises 2013). Professor Karla McKanders has 
thoughtfully explored the parallels between this period of history and contemporary immigration 
enforcement practices. See generally Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the 
Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921 (2012) (comparing the 
Fugitive Slave Acts with current immigration policies). 
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states,12 but generally, this was a time of expansion in the U.S. popula-
tion and economy, and there was neither a general system of visas or 
entry permits nor any means of excluding people from coming. For 
white immigrants who homesteaded, presence quickly became full 
membership, as homesteaders-typically white Europeans-could 
claim full legal status as citizens after fulfilling homestead require-
ments for a five-year period.13 During this period, too, immigrants 
from Asia were able to enter freely and did so in significant numbers 
to work on the railroads or in mining camps in the West. 14 
2. 1880s Through 1965 
In this time period, the federal government moved to assert its 
ability and authority to regulate immigration and imposed restrictions 
that were largely racially-based, although other categories were used 
as the basis to bar entry as well. In 1875, the Page Act created catego-
ries of exclusion for "any subject of China, Japan or any Oriental 
Country" (including for involuntary labor or "lewd and immoral pur-
poses"); the Act also broadly regulated the immigration of prostitutes 
and those who had been convicted of "felonious crimes."15 This law 
was followed in 1882 by the Chinese Exclusion Act, which put a ten-
year moratorium on Chinese immigration, and excluded "skilled and 
unskilled laborers."16 Congress extended the moratorium another ten 
years in 189217 and extended it indefinitely in 1902.18 The 1917 Asi-
atic Barred Zone extended these restrictions to all prospective Asian 
12. See Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009) (citing GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITU. 
T10N: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996». 
13. Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862). Homesteading was directed to and mar-
keted at prospective European settlers, not immigrants from other parts of the world. See 
Abrams, supra note 12, at 1403. Beyond implementation targeted at Europeans, citizenship was 
only granted without regard to race through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, so the claim to 
citizenship from homesteading de facto only existed for white homesteaders. See id. at 1413-14. 
The Naturalization Act of 1870, which limited naturalization to "white persons and persons of 
African descent" also put the Homesteading possibility out of reach of immigrants from other 
ethnicities who could not meet the requirement that they be eligible for citizenship at the end of 
the homesteading period. You Can, But You Can't!, HOMESTEAD CONGo (Aug. 12,2011,9:00 
AM), http://homesteadcongress.blogspot.coml2011108/you-can-but-you-cant.html. 
14. See ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHI. 
NESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA xi (1971); see also Leila Higgins, Immigration and the Vulnera-
ble Worker: We Built This Country on Cheap Labor, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 522, 528--32 
(2013). 
15. Page Act, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). 
16. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1952). 
17. Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892). 
18. Act of Apr. 29, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176 (1902). 
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immigrants, and also put immigration off limits for "mental defec-
tives," interpreted to include homosexuals.19 
The 1924 Johnson-Reed Act instituted quotas for immigrants, set-
ting the level of available visas to two percent of the number of people 
from any given country living in the U.S. as of 1890, a time when im-
migration was dominated by Northern and Western Europeans.20 The 
law entirely excluded Asians and banned immigrants from Asia from 
ever acquiring citizenship, no matter how long they lived in the U.S.21 
The 1924 law has been widely regarded as a law intending to freeze a 
certain racial make-up for the country.22 In the same period, de facto 
barriers were set up for Mexicans and others, through literacy test, 
entry taxes and humiliating entry procedures, as has been comprehen-
sively documented by historian Mae Ngai.23 
B. Attempting to Make Immigration a Civil Rights Issue: The 
1965 Immigration Act 
With some adjustments in between, including expanding the right 
to naturalize to immigrants of Asian descent,24 the next great shift in 
U.S. immigration policy occurred during the heyday of the civil rights 
movement, with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1965.25 The 1965 Act was very much part of the civil rights move-
ment's emphasis on removing color-barriers from our laws, and the 
bill's drafters consciously saw their role as crafting another piece of 
civil rights legislation by removing those barriers.26 Senator Hiram 
Fong of Hawaii said at the time that the old quotas were like Jim 
19. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New 
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 281 n.30 (1996); Tracy 
J. Davis, Opening the Doors of Immigration: Sexual Orientation and Asylum in the United States, 
6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19, 19 (1999). 
20. Leticia M. Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants, Cultural Narratives, and National Origin, 44 
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 305, 329 n.154 (2012). 
21. (Johnson-Reed) Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153. 
22. See Saucedo, supra note 20, at 328-29 n.154 (exploring the power of narratives about 
Mexican immigrants). 
23. NGAI, supra note 8, at 64-75; see also Saucedo, supra note 20 at 328-29 n.154. 
24. Chin, supra note 19, at 281-82. 
25. Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") of 1965 (Hart-Cellar Act), Pub. L. 89-236, 79 
Stat. 911 (1965). 
26. Chin, supra note 19, at 299-302; see also Jennifer Ludden, 1965 Immigration Law 
Changed Face of America, NPR (May 9, 2006, 3:35 PM), http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=5391395 (quoting Karen Narasaki of the Asian American Justice Center) ("It 
was not what people were marching in the streets over in the 1960s .. " It was really a group of 
political elites who were trying to look into the future. And again, it was the issue of, 'Are we 
going to be true to what we say our values are?'''). 
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Crow segregation that contradicted "America's ideal of the equality of 
all men without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin.'>27 
Representative Laurence Burton remarked that "[j]ust as we sought 
to eliminate discrimination in our land through the Civil Rights Act, 
today we seek by phasing out the national origins quota system to 
eliminate discrimination in immigration to this Nation composed of 
the descendants of immigrants."28 Seeing that the national-origins 
quota resulted in heavily racialized patterns of immigration, the Act 
eliminated those quotas, and established formal equality among na-
tions in terms of the number of visas available: no nation could claim 
more than seven percent of the available visas in any given year.29 In 
signing the bill, President Johnson stated: 
[Signing the bill] is still one of the most important acts of this 
Congress and of this administration. 
For it does repair a very deep and painful flaw in the fabric of 
American justice. It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the con-
duct of the American Nation. 
[T]he fact is that for over four decades the immigration policy 
of the United States has been twisted and has been distorted by the 
harsh injustice of the national origins quota system?O 
The Act, and its demolition of the quota system, began a decades-
long period of intense demographic change in the U.S.-change that 
has been both lauded and lamented.31 Although these demographic 
consequences were largely unforeseen to lawmakers,32 several specific 
structures set up in the 1965 Act permitted them to happen. A look at 
two countries alone, among many others, shows the sweep of this. 
Dramatic increases in immigration from the Philippines show the 
27. To Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Congo 43-45 (1965) (statement of Sen. Fong). 
28. Chin, supra note 19, at 302 (quoting 111 CONGo REc. 21,783 (1965)). 
29. See U.S.c. § 1152(a)(2) (2012). 
30. President Lyndon B. Johnson's Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty 
Island, New York, 2 PUB. PAPERS 546 (Oct. 3, 1965), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/ 
johnson/archives.hornlspeeches.hornl651003.asp. 
31. See Chin, supra note 19, at 276-78; see also Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The 
Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Sept. 1995), http://cis.org/ 
1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration. 
32. Chin, supra note 19, at 278. Chin argues that some of the change was expected, espe-
cially the increase in inImigration from Asia. Id. at 305 ("The prevailing scholarly view does not 
give Congress enough credit. Close examination of the legislative history and interviews with 
people involved in the bill suggest that Congress knew more Asians would inImigrate."). 
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power of the immigration options created by the 1965 Act on the fam-
ily-based side, where there were multiple paths for not just parents, 
spouses and children, but also siblings.33 Drawing primarily on such 
paths, migration from the Philippines tripled between 1980 and 2006.34 
Likewise, on the employment-based side of immigration, the removal 
of racial restrictions has permitted enormous numbers of Indian immi-
grants to migrate for work in the technology sector, with Indian immi-
grants accounting for sixty-four percent of those who receive RIB 
visas for specialized workers.35 Beyond these examples, immigration 
has also increased from many other non-European countries that had 
not historically sent any significant numbers of migrants.36 The im-
pact of the 1965 Act has been clear, and it has been one diversifying 
legal migration from historically under-represented countries. But as 
33. INA § 203(a). 
34. Aaron Terrazas, US in Focus: Filipino Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION 
POL'y INST. (Sept. 2008), http://www.migrationinformation.org!usfocus/display.cfm?ID=694 
("The number of Filipino immigrants in the United States tripled between 1980 and 2006, from 
501,440 to 1.6 million, making them the second largest immigrant group in the United States 
after Mexican immigrants and ahead of the Chinese, Indian, and Vietnamese foreign born."). A 
separate MPI report attributes the migration to family-based immigration. Sierra Stoney & 
Jeanne Batalova, US in Focus: Filipino Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POL'y INST. 
(June 2013), http://www.migrationinformation.org!usfocus/display.cfm?ID=954 ("The foreign 
born from the Philippines gained LPR status mostly through family reunification. About 87 
percent obtained green cards through family relationships, 13 percent through employment, and 
less than 1 percent through other routes, including a small number of refugees or asylees."). 
35. Neil G. Ruiz, H-1B Visas and Immigration Reform: A Sticking Point in the U.S.-India 
Relationship, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 18, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.brookings.edul blogs/up-
frontlposts/2013/09/18-immigration-reform-us-india-ruiz. Also notable, however, is the fact that 
for both countries, eligibility for visas surpasses the numbers available for issuing visas because 
of per-country limits, another piece of formal equality found in the 1965 Act. Mae M. Ngai, 
Reforming Immigration for Good, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.coml2013/01l 
3010pinionlreformmg-immigration-for-good.html. The Act has also been criticized for perpetu-
ating undocumented migration from Mexico. Professor Gerald Lopez notes, "Desirous of being 
perceived as the 'egalitarian champion of the "free world," 'Congress ended the 1920s system 
that favored Western European immigrants and established an open system based on family 
reunification and equality between countries of origin. The changes led to significant (and 
largely unanticipated) shifts in legal migration. But the new regime severely reduced to 120,000 
the number of immigrant visas available to Mexico and the Western Hemisphere, leading imme-
diately to a huge and growing backlog. And the egalitarian system made no room for-did not 
acknowledge and did not legally accommodate-the massive undocumented migration of Mexi-
can labor that had already become an essential feature of U.S. and Mexican life and, not coinci-
dentally, again avoided enacting employer sanctions." Gerald P. Lopez, Don't We Like Them 
Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1711, 1772 (2012). No country may claim more than seven 
percent of all available visas, so would-be immigrants from countries like India and the Philip-
pines, where many are eligible for visas, face long waits before visa numbers are made available 
to them. Ngai, supra note 35. 
36. The Center for Immigration Studies, which advocates heavily restricted immigration, 
presents a graph showing the changes, derived from the INS Statistical yearbook. Three Decades 
of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act, CIS (Sept. 1995), http://cis.org! 
1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration. 
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Jack Chin noted in his thorough assessment of the law's intentions and 
impact, "[i]f the magnitude of the change was unexpected, it was also 
probably not a major issue to a group of legislators who, by passing 
laws prohibiting discrimination in a variety of contexts, demonstrated 
the sincerity of their faith in the irrationality of racial distinctions. "37 
C. Formal Equality, Functional Inequality Since 1965 
The 1965 Act was the high-water mark for seeing immigration as 
a place of equality in the law, as the 1960s were for civil rights gener-
ally. Just as the civil rights laws of the 1960s set broad societal changes 
in motion, from voting to workplaces to schools and beyond, the 1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act set in motion significant demo-
graphic changes across the nation. And just as other civil rights era 
achievements are being rolled back in today's political climate, the 
civil rights achievement in immigration reform is likewise rolling back, 
with a widening gap between the formal equality created by the 1965 
Act, and the functional inequality in amendments and enforcement 
since that time. This disparate impact has many sources, but I will 
look briefly today at two sources: the conjoining of immigration status 
and employment authorization in 1986, and the hyper-conflation of 
the criminal justice system with immigration enforcement since 1996. 
The gap between the 1965 law's commitment to formal equality 
and the situation for immigrants of color has widened slowly and 
steadily. However, before turning to that general trend, I want to 
note two significant exceptions, one of which endures, and the other 
of which is being rolled back now. The first exception is the story of 
civil rights for gay and lesbian immigrants. Restrictions on entry for 
homosexuals, which existed since 1917 and were entrenched in the 
1952 McCarren-Walter Act, persisted with the 1965 Act.38 And while 
family-based immigration increased, gay and lesbian marriages were 
not recognized for immigration purposes39 even before the Defense of 
Marriage Act.40 As the movement for gay rights has led to state after 
37. Chin, supra note 19, at 278. 
38. See JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. 
THE SUPREME COURT 89-101 (2001) (discussing a fascinating account of George Fleuti's exper-
iences demonstrating how barriers against homosexual immigration were enforced). 
39. First established through case law, the Ninth Circuit held that even if a gay marriage 
were locally valid, it could not provide the basis for a spousal petition because federal definitions 
controlled under the plenary power doctrine. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038, 1040 
(9th Crr. 1982). 
40. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996). 
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state recognizing gay marriage, and Congress repealing DOMA, path-
ways for gay and lesbian immigrants opened up rapidly-a counter-
point to the story of erosion in the area of race, and one that is in no 
danger of being reversed. 
A second exception extending the spirit of the 1965 Act was the 
1986 creation (and 1990 extension) of the diversity visa for under-rep-
resented countries.41 This new visa uses a lottery system to allocate 
visas to individuals from "low admission" countries-countries send-
ing, relatively, the least numbers of immigrants annually (although 
Ireland was also prominently included, prompting it to be called the 
"Irish sweepstakes").42 Because other pathways depend on the exis-
tence of previous immigrant connections (family members who could 
petition for relatives) or employment (the bulk of other immigrant 
and nonimmigrant visas), legislators wanted to provide visas for those 
without such routes available.43 Unlike President Johnson's emphasis 
on the importance of removing racial barriers to immigration in 1965, 
however, President Bush's remarks on the passage of the 1990 Act 
entirely omitted reference to the diversity visa, focusing instead on 
family reunification provisions and provisions related to the war on 
drugs.44 And unlike the progress made for LGBT immigration since 
1965, the diversity visa is, as discussed below, the first on the chopping 
block for reform. 
On one side of the story then, we see increasing diversification of 
immigration since 1965, and doors being opened explicitly for immi-
grants from underrepresented countries in 1990 and, most recently, 
for LGBT immigrants. On the other side of the story is the disparate 
impact of immigration laws and enforcement on communities of color, 
41. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314, 100 Stat. 3359, 
3439. The visa was extended, but with forty percent reserved for the Irish, in 1990. See Immigra-
tion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 132(c), 104 Stat. 4978, 5000; see also Andowah A. 
Newton, Note, Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy: The Diversity Visa Program and 
the Missing Discourse on Its Impact on African Immigration to the United States, 38 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 1049 (2005) (discussing the impact of the diversity visa program on African 
immigration). 
42. Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After "9/ 
11?", 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 330 (2003). 
43. The intent-and moral and ethical justifications for the program-have been debated 
and questioned. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 329 (1993); Victor C. Romero, Symposium on Confronting Realities: The 
Legal, Moral, and Constitutional Issues Involving Diversity Panel II: Critical Race Theory in 
Three Acts: Racial Profiling, Affirmative Action, and the Diversity Visa Lottery, 66 ALB. L. REV. 
375, 383 (2003). 
44. Presidential Signing Statement on Immigration Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. 
Doc. 1946 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
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despite the promises of formal equality in the law, largely because the 
undocumented population is so predominantly non-European in 
origin.45 
The first site of this disparate impact is in the workplace. The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 198646 legalized 
large numbers of the undocumented in exchange for workplace con-
trols; IRCA required proof of work authorization (almost always 
available only through lawful immigration status) in order for workers 
to be lawfully hired.47 This requirement pushed the new undocu-
mented-those who either did not qualify for IRCA, or those who 
arrived subsequently48-into an underground economy where em-
ployers hired workers without the correct paperwork, leaving them 
extremely vulnerable to various forms of workplace exploitation.49 
As the undocumented population grew over the subsequent de-
cades,50 IRCA created a sizeable underc1ass of undocumented work-
ers whose workplace rights were violated with great frequency and 
relative impunity. 
Compounding these difficulties, the workplace also quickly be-
came the principal site for enforcement after 9/11. During the Bush 
Administration, workplace enforcement was characterized first by 
militaristic workplace raids, such as the dramatic Postville Raid in 
Iowa, when immigration agents in helicopters and SUVs raided an ag-
ricultural factory and arrested 389 immigrants. 51 Under President 
45. The Department of Homeland Security notes that in 2011, fifty-nine percent of the un-
documented population was from Mexico (6.8 million people), followed by EI Salvador 
(600,000), Guatemala (520,000), Honduras (380,000) and China (280,000). MICHAEL HOEFER ET 
AL., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION 
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 4 (2012). 
46. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314, 100 Stat. 3359. 
47. Id. § 314. 
48. These two categories overlap substantially, as IRCA, itself, contained a provision limit-
ing eligibility to those who had arrived by January 1, 1982. Id. § 20l(a). 
49. See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS 
ARE NOT GETTING PAID-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 62 (2011). 
50. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (IIRIRA). The Act also had the unintended consequence 
of trapping the undocumented in America. Where previous generations of the undocumented, 
from Mexico and Central America particularly had gone back and forth with some fluidity, 
working when there was work, leaving when there was none, IIRIRA's creation of a ten-year bar 
for the accrual of unlawful presence essentially stopped that. Id. § 301 (amending 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1182). Anyone with a year or more of unlawful presence would be forbidden to re-enter for 
ten years. Id. As new migrants arrived, and previous migrants could not easily leave, the un-
documented population grew. 
51. For a dramatic account of the raid and its complicated aftermath, see Maggie Jones, 
Postville, Iowa Is Up for Grabs, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 11,2012, at http://www.nytimes.coml2012/07/15/ 
magazine/postville-iowa-is-up-for-grabs.html?pagewanted::all. 
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Obama, less dramatic but equally consequential audits of workplaces 
brought undocumented workers to the attention of immigration 
authorities.52 
A second powerful site to demonstrate how immigration enforce~ 
ment disparately impacts communities of color is the criminal justice 
system. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (IIRIRA)53 vastly expanded the number of crimes 
that would trigger deportation.54 Such crimes included low level drug 
crimes and other minor offenses, and the law simultaneously removed 
most judicial discretion that could have given lower-level offenders a 
second chance.55 Since 1996, second chances have been remarkably 
hard to come by, with only 10,000 slots available for the form of relief, 
or redemption, known as "Cancellation of Removal,"56 which itself 
requires not repentance but a showing of exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship to U.S. citizen spouses or children-a level of hard-
ship far surpassing the known hardships of families being divided, in-
comes being lost, and lives built over years or decades in America 
being ended.57 Although not an explicit racial barrier to immigration, 
the over-policing of communities of color and disparate rates of ar-
rests and convictions of people-particularly men-of color means 
that this intersection of the criminal and immigration systems rein-
troduces race powerfully into immigration enforcement. 58 
This intersection is exacerbated by the issue of the extent to 
which racial profiling is permitted-and in the recent past, required-
in the immigration context. First, in the national security setting, pro-
52. Here again, the history of slave labor casts a shadow on today's immigration debates. 
As Karla McKanders has discussed, slave labor existed without the laborers being seen as mem-
bers, as undocumented workers in oftentimes vulnerable, dangerous occupations are denied 
membership as well. McKanders, supra note 11, at 949 ("The key connection between the Fugi-
tive Slave Acts and current migration policies is the ways in which immigration law and policy 
have facilitated dehumanization and created a quasi-citizen worker."). 
53. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
54. I1RlRA also placed both deportation and exclusion proceedings under the rubric of 
"removal," but the term deportation is still popularly used for the removal of any immigrant, 
whether formally admitted, seeking admission, or present without having been inspected. Id. tit. 
III. 
55. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1940-41 (2000). 
56. INA § 240A. 
57. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 59 (BIA 2001) (holding that the excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship standard requires hardship "substantially beyond that 
which ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien's deportation."). 
58. See generally Keyes, Defining American, supra note 3 (illustrating the role played by 
race at every stage of the immigration pipeline, from acquiring status, to maintaining it, to be-
coming a citizen). 
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filing by national-origin was explicitly required for a decade. For a 
period of time following 9/11, country-specific immigration require-
ments retuned and slammed the doors closed for many Arabs and 
South Asians who had been here lawfully, or who aspired to come.59 
1,200 noncitizens from predominantly Muslim countries were de-
tained following the 9/11 attacks,60 and interior enforcement efforts 
focused on men from countries where Al Qaeda had been active.61 
During this time, the government also implemented a program of spe-
cial registration for men from those predominantly Muslim countries 
that remained in effect from 2002 until 2011.62 Advocates also decried 
profiling and surveillance based on national origins in the broader im-
migration context (such as differential attention paid in border inter-
views and naturalization applications).63 
Second, in immigration enforcement more generally, racial profil-
ing is actually condoned-to a large extent-by the Supreme Court 
decision in U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce,64 which allows police to consider 
race alongside other factors ("Mexican appearance") when making an 
59. Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Post-9/II Policies Dramatically Alter the US Immi-
gration Landscape, MIGRATION POL'y INST. (Sep. 8, 2011), http://www.migrationinformation 
.orglUSFocus/display.cfm?ID=852. 
60. Muzaffar A. Chishti et. al., America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and 
National Unity After September 11, MIGRATION POL'y INST. 2003, at 12. 
61. Memorandum from the Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidance for Ab-
sconder Apprehension Initiative (Jan. 25, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ 
abscndr012502mem.pdf. See generally Nora Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Ter-
rorism as a War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 No.6 CRIM. L. BULL. 2 
(2004) (discussing "the connections among terrorism, crime and immigration within the last 
decade"). 
62. DHS Removes Designated Countries from NSEERS Registration, DEP'T HOMELAND 
SEC. (May 2011), https:llwww.dhs.gov/dhs-removes-designated-countries-nseers-registration-
may-2011; see also ARAB-AMERICAN INSTITUTE, NATIONAL SECURITY ENTRY EXIT REGISTRA· 
TION SYSTEM 1 (n.d.). Then-INS connected immigration and national security in the following 
way in setting up procedures for special registration: 
Terrorist attacks have claimed the lives of thousands of Americans, as well as nationals 
from many other countries. As a result, new regulations have gone into effect to help 
ensure the safety of all persons in the United States. These regulations require the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to register certain individuals in the in-
terest of national security or law enforcement. 
Special Registration Procedures, INS (Sep. 11, 2002), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/nseers ISRProc 
.pdf. 
63. DEEPA hER, SOUTH ASIAN AMERICANS LEADING TOGETHER, WRITTEN TESTIMONY 
FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL 
RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, HEARING ON RACIAL PROFILING AND THE USE OF SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATIONS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY 7-8 (2010). 
64. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975); see Kevin Johnson, How 
Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and 
Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 
(2010). 
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immigration stop.65 Part of the Court's justification was the seeming 
un controllability of immigration from Mexico along the southern bor-
der66 (a concern eerily reminiscent of the opinion upholding the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act, speaking of the "hordes" of Chinese "invading" 
America67). This permissibility of profiling, except in egregious cases, 
exists alongside exceptionally heightened levels of federal immigra-
tion enforcement68 that involve state law enforcement,69 potentially 
creating a perfect storm for local law enforcement to engage in racial 
profiling in the name of implementing federal immigration law. In-
deed, Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona, built his na-
tional reputation on his tough stance toward "illegal immigrants," and 
was a long-time participant in the federal government's 287(g) pro-
gram to deputize local law enforcement entities to act as immigration 
enforcers.7o He instructed his officers that "they could consider race 
or 'Mexican ancestry' as one factor among others in making law en-
forcement decisions during immigration enforcement operations with-
out violating the legal requirements pertaining to racial bias in 
policing."71 Arpaio, for example, launched "saturation patrols" to 
make pre-textual stops in the hopes of identifying undocumented im-
65. Even if race were impermissibly used as the only factor in an immigration stop, exclud-
ing such evidence is difficult (although not impossible) under Lopez-Mendoza, because the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not generally apply in removal proceedings (al-
though it can apply if the violation was egregious). Immigration & Naturalization Servo v. Lo-
pez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). Professor Kristina Campbell explores this subject in 
relation to the Arizona law. Kristina Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in 
Immigration Enforcement After Arizona V. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'y 367, 386 
(2013). 
66. "The Government makes a convincing demonstration that the public interest demands 
effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border. Estimates of the 
number of illegal immigrants in the United States vary widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 
produced a figure of about one million, but the INS now suggests there may be as many as 10 or 
12 million aliens illegally in the country. Whatever the number, these aliens create significant 
economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and 
generating extra demand for social services." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79. 
67. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
68. President Obama's administration removed 1.9 million immigrants by the end of fiscal 
year 2013, although the rate slowed somewhat in 2013. Julia Preston, U.S. Deportations Decline; 
Felons Made Up Big Share, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,2013 at A20. 
69. Whether this involvement is encouraged, required, or commandeered is a matter of 
debate, as the recent debate over California's TRUST Act demonstrated. Under the TRUST 
Act, California would only honor Immigration and Custom Enforcement detainers for immi-
grants convicted of serious offenses, instead of for all those arrested. Patrick McGreevy, Brown 
Resets Bar on Migrant Rights; Governor Signs Trust Act, Giving Expanded Protections for Those 
Here Illegally, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at A1. 
70. INA § 287(g). 
71. Melendres V. Arpaio, 2013 WL 2297173, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2013). 
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migrants.72 A federal court found that Arpaio had engaged in imper-
missible racial profiling in 2013.73 But as states continue seeking ways 
to use state law enforcement agents to enforce federal immigration 
law, such as the S.B. 1070 law in Arizona,14 the threat of racial profil-
ing persists. 
As a result of these various trends, enforcement itself became 
heavily racialized even while the 1965 Act's formal equality remained 
in place. This erosion of the egalitarian goals of 1965 mirrors the 
widely critiqued problems of disparate racial impacts from health to 
education to criminal justice despite the nation's explicit abandon-
ment of racial discrimination in the law. 
II. REFORM TODAY: A NEW PARADIGM OF WORTHINESS 
AND THE CREATION OF THE "SUPER 
UNDOCUMENTED"75 
Our current efforts at immigration reform spring from this mud-
dled context, where goals of equality have been undermined by an 
increasingly draconian enforcement system, with its criminal justice 
and national security intersections. Immigration reform is intended to 
fix the "broken" immigration system, one whose broken-ness is un-
derscored by the fact of eleven million people living in the U.S. with-
out any legal immigration status?6 Scholars have noted how this 
undocumented population leads the public to conflate the phenome-
non of immigration with "illegality" and how the status quo under-
72. [d. at *114. 
73. [d. at *273. 
74. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). The law contained a provision permitting police to stop individuals 
suspected of lacking immigration status. While conceding that the law's opponents had voiced 
fears of racial profiling, the Supreme Court upheld that provision in Arizona v. United States to 
give the state a chance to find a way of enforcing the law that would not fall afoul of racial 
profiling prohibitions. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see also ACLU & 
RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 43 (2009). 
75. This term was coined by Mike Wishnie, Director, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services 
Organization at Yale Law School, and I first heard the term used by his colleague Muneer 
Ahmad, Clinical Professor of Law at Yale University, at the AALS Clinical Conference in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, Apr. 2013. 
76. Although the size of the undocumented population is necessarily an estimate, eleven 
million is a widely accepted figure. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR. & PEW HISPANIC CTR., A 
NATION OF IMMIGRANTS: A PORTRAIT OF THE 40 MILLION, INCLUDING 11 MILLION UNAUTHO-
RIZED (2013). 
914 [VOL. 57:899 
Race and Immigration, Then and Now 
mines the rule of law.77 The reform efforts seek to address these 
problems while improving the future flows of immigrants so that the 
law does not generate millions of new undocumented in subsequent 
decades, as happened after the 1986 reform. Unfortunately, the Sen-
ate Bill, passed in July 2013, and still the most detailed articulation of 
what comprehensive reform could look like, is estimated to leave out 
several million of the eleven million undocumented.78 And piecemeal 
bills that could be taken up by the House of Representatives are, as 
described below, unlikely to do any better, which means that one im-
petus driving reform-fixing the situation of the eleven million in the 
shadows-will not be fully addressed. Thus, while immigration re-
form is theoretically fixing a problem affecting, in particular, commu-
nities of color in the U.S., and while there is much to appreciate and 
celebrate in the bill for fixing some of the difficulties described above, 
what is equally clear is that it will exclude many, especially from 
marginalized communities of color, as the framework deliberately, 
ever more explicitly, shifts from away from formal equality to worthi-
ness. Indeed, a problem of the new "super undocumented"-those 
left out of reform entirely for a broad range of reasons-will be cre-
ated the day any such reform is signed into law, creating inequalities 
that undermine and reverse the egalitarian goals of the 1965 Act. 
A. The People Excluded from Immigration Reform 
With such dramatic numbers of people left out of reform, it is 
clear that fixing the problem of the eleven million undocumented is 
not the only goal of the legalization component of immigration re-
form. Rather, reform offers an opportunity to pick and choose those 
most worthy of inclusion. While many of these factors are under-
standable and some are normatively appealing (the idea that length of 
time and connection to the community matter, for example), two 
problems bear mentioning immediately. First, it is a specific choice to 
cut into the size of the legalization program by making inclusion con-
tingent on meeting so many factors-and such contingencies under-
mine the "rule of law" goal of legalization (addressing the concern 
that a vast population of people indefinitely living without documents 
77. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 536 (2009). 
78. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 3.5 million will not gain legal status as a 
result of the law. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S.744, BORDER SECURITY, Eco. 
NOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION ACT 21 (2013). 
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undermines the rule of law generally). Second, and explored in more 
detail below, reform that purposefully excludes millions also purpose-
fully creates a new, profoundly marginalized class of "super undocu-
mented." If the undocumented is the subject of controversy and even 
hatred pre-reform,19 those left out of reform are likely to be even 
more reviled, as their lack of status will signify their status as those 
least desired among the undocumented population. Before discussing 
the implications of this, I am interested in who these new "super un-
documented" are and how they reflect America's sense of who least 
deserves inclusion-the true "aliens" in our midst, those not worthy 
of being brought under the reform umbrella. I turn now to these 
groups. 
The first group left out of reform comprises those who arrived 
most recently, upholding a tradition of valuing connection to commu-
nity. The Senate Bill stops relief for those who entered after Decem-
ber 2011.80 Indeed, the only affirmative eligibility requirement, 
before the bill defines exceptions to eligibility, is physical presence 
before December 31, 2011.81 It has been a common wisdom in immi-
gration law, as in other areas of the law, that longevity is significant, 
and that our willingness to remove immigrants may rightfully diminish 
the longer they are present here.82 The "cancellation of removal" pro-
vision in the Immigration and Nationality Act explicitly recognizes 
that, as it opens the possibility for individuals without lawful perma-
nent residence (LPR status) who have been in the U.S. ten years or 
more continuously to obtain LPR status, if they can show that their 
removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to 
citizen spouses or children (another element of the relief that approxi-
mates membership and integration in America).83 The December 30, 
2011 requirement knocks out a significant percentage of the currently 
undocumented, perhaps 500-700,000 (or approximately 4-6%).84 In-
79. See Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners, supra note 3, at 250. 
80. s. 744, 113th Congo § 2101. 
81. Id. 
82. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IM-
MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (tracing, among other ideas, the 
mUltiple ways that immigration law has recognized and rewarded longevity and connection). In 
the context of removing immigrants convicted of crimes, Juliet Stumpf has explored how longev-
ity matters far less as "the law privileges the moment of the crime as the determining factor for 
often-permanent expulsion." Juliet Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of 
Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1709 (2011). 
83. INA § 240A. 
84. David Nakamura, Immigration Deal Would Exclude Millions, WASH. POST, July 28, 
2013, at A03. 
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deed, when I asked my immigration clinic students at the University 
of Baltimore to consider how many of our clients during the fall 2013 
semester might benefit from reform, this provision alone knocked 
eleven of the twelve clients out of contention. All had arrived too 
recently. Despite the appeal of requiring a degree of connection to 
community, using the proxy of time in the U.S., this provision will be a 
major source of the new "super undocumented," with all the attend-
ant problems discussed below. 
Another requirement to benefit from reform is that individuals 
demonstrate that they have met all their tax liabilities.85 This require-
ment occurs both at the initial application stage, and the ultimate ad-
justment of status stage (at the end of the twelve year waiting 
period).86 This understandable requirement comes from the percep-
tion, a grossly overstated one, that undocumented immigrants uni-
formly do not pay taxes. While the truth is far more ambiguous, the 
commitment to paying taxes is of a piece with the legalization plan in 
general, bringing people into the rule of law where they had been in 
the shadows previously. However, there is going to be considerable 
difficulty for many immigrants as they try to assemble documentation 
to retrace tax obligations from years when employers were paying 
them in cash and not providing W2s. Many immigrants work in occu-
pations where they are the sole employee, like domestic work or being 
a home health care companion, where employers are less likely to 
generate the paperwork that would help the employees comply with 
their tax obligations.87 
Another provision will challenge immigrants working at society'S 
economic margins, namely, the requirement that people be able to 
work for the twelve years it will take before receiving permanent resi-
dence, with no more than a sixty-day gap in employment.88 In a reces-
sionary period where the workforce is increasingly irregular and 
85. S. 744, 113th Congo § 2101. The extent of the liabilities is not detailed in the bill and will 
presumably be governed by the tax code, which currently treats most immigrants working in the 
United States the same as citizens in terms of their tax obligations. 
86. S. 744, 113th Congo §§ 2101-2102. 
87. See generally Sharon Parrott and Robert Greenstein, Benefit Restrictions Beyond Those 
in Senate Immigration Bill Would Jeopardize Legalization for Many and Risk Severe Hardships 
for Others, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL'y PRIORITIES (June 14, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/ 
?fa=view&id=3974 (detailing the effect the Senate Immigration Bill would have on undocu-
mented workers). 
88. S. 744, 113th Cong § 245B(c)(9)(B)(i)(I). Registered provisional immigrant status can-
not be extended unless the immigrant can show that her or she was regularly employed through-
out the period of admission as a registered proVisional immigrant, allowing for brief periods 
lasting not more than 60 days. Id. The bill provides exceptions for time when the immigrant was 
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unstable, such job stability is challenging. Workers in occupations that 
vary by seasons, from construction to landscaping, may be produc-
tively employed over the course of a year in terms of income-earned, 
but exceed sixty-day unemployment periods within any given year, 
and these occupations rely heavily on immigrant labor. Worse, it pro-
vides an incentive for workers to stay in bad employment because the 
immigration consequences of leaving are too great. 
The reform's requirement of demonstrating English-language 
skills89 will eliminate many more from legalization. Many immigrants 
do learn English, and wait lists for ESL classes have historically been 
lengthyYo Many obstacles, however, limit the effectiveness of those 
classes or the ability of people to take them or learn English in other 
ways. Whether because working multiple jobs limits the time availa-
ble for studying, because classes are unavailable, or because learning 
language at later stages of life is difficult even for the most educated 
(and many of the undocumented were poorly educated in their own 
countries),91 English language proficiency is a hurdle. Currently, ap-
proximately one half of the undocumented lack the English skills to 
be able to pass the proficiency test associated with citizenship,92 which 
suggests that even slightly less stringent proficiency requirements will 
be responsible for 3.6 million people not qualifying. 
Finally, any of a series of criminal convictions will remove people 
from the umbrella of reform. Someone with a single state felony con-
viction, a single immigration "aggravated felony" (a term of art en-
compassing crimes that states might classify as misdemeanors) or 
three or more misdemeanor convictions will be ineligible.93 This is 
on medical, maternity, or employment leave, or enrolled full-time in school. §§ 245C(b)(3)(D), 
(E). 
89. § 245C(b)(4) provides that only those who meet the standards for English proficiency 
required for naturalization under INA § 312 may adjust their status to lawful permanent 
residence. 
90. JAMES THOMAS TUCKER, NALEO ED. FUND, THE ESL LoGJAM: WAITING TIMES FOR 
ADULT ESL CLASSES AND THE IMPACT ON ENGLISH LEARNERS 1 (2006). 
91. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, "Adult unauthorized immigrants are dispropor-
tionately likely to be poorly educated. Among unauthorized immigrants ages 25-64, 47% have 
less than a high school education." JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 
A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES iv (2009). 
92. One-third clearly fall below the standard, with Level 3 proficiency. A majority lack 
Level 4 proficiency or below, but because the citizenship test currently requires a level between 
Level 3 and Level 4, it is not quite possible to say where the percentage falls. Marc R. Rosen-
blum et aI., Earned Legalization: Effects of Proposed Requirements on Unauthorized Men, Wo-
men, and Children, MIGRATION POL'y INST., Jan. 2011, at 7. 
93. S. 744, 113th Congo § 245B(b)(3)(A)(i). There is the possibility of a waiver for those 
with three or more misdemeanors, "for humanitarian purposes, to ensure family unity, or if such 
a waiver is otherwise in the public interest." § 245B(b)(B)(i). 
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uncontroversial for most-if anyone is to be left out, it should be 
those who committed crimes while "guests on our shores." That im-
pulse to expel criminals runs deep in immigration history, and as 
noted above, has been deepening over recent decades; immigration is 
overwhelmingly depicted in the media as a crime control issue.94 It is 
therefore utterly unsurprising to see it as a factor in the Senate Bill, 
but it does mean that many more immigrants will not qualify for 
reform. 
Even without ineligibility problems at the outset, problems of ap-
plication fees and lack of information may limit the reach of reform, 
as happened with IRCA in 1986.95 The Senate Bill imposes a $1,000 
penalty, in addition to application filing fees, for anyone seeking to 
benefit from the legalization provisions.96 Recent experience with the 
Administration's program to provide temporary employment authori-
zation for certain immigrant youth (the Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals, or "DACA," program) suggests that such fees put 
relief out of reach for many families. Many perceived DACA to be a 
precursor to the rollout of immigration reform, and this economic bar-
rier-intended not to exclude but simply to generate fees to cover the 
program's costs-provides a cautionary tale for the roll-out of 
broader immigration reform.97 With an estimated twenty percent of 
adult, undocumented immigrants living in poverty,98 the monetary 
penalty and fees may make otherwise eligible individuals unable to 
participate. Indeed, the Social Security Administration estimates that 
as many as 400,000 might drop out of the legalization program be-
cause of these costS.99 
94. Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, 
Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 1106, 1112 (2013) (citing BROOKINGS INST. & UNIV. 
OF S. CAL., ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC'N, DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF NEW MEDIA: A 
REPORT ON THE MEDIA AND THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 13,23-27 (2008)) (analyzing coverage 
of immigration since 1980 and concluding that it has "focused overwhelmingly" on crime and 
other illegality). 
95. See Betsy Cooper & Kevin O'Neil, Lessons from the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, MIGRATION POL'y INST., Aug. 2005. 
96. S. 744, 113th Congo § 245C(c)(5)(B). 
97. Gordon Whitman, How Many Could Be Left Out of Immigration Reform?, HUF-
FINGTON POST (May 7, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlgordon-whitmanlhow-
many-could-be-Ieft-ou_b_3222685.html. 
98. PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 17 (2009). 
99. Nakamura, supra note 84. 
2014] 919 
Howard Law Journal 
B. Who, by Contrast, is Welcome 
Beyond the steadily-employed, English-proficient, financially 
able immigrants with limited or no criminal records, the Senate Bill 
also provides a simpler, shorter path for two other groups. One group 
comprises the youth who were brought to the U.S. before the age of 
sixteen, usually by their parents. lOO These youth, known collectively 
as the DREAMers, qualify for permanent residence much more 
quickly-after five years instead of twelve.101 They also do not need 
to pay the $1,000 penalty required of registered provisional immi-
grants.102 A second group consists of agricultural workers who must 
meet comparable requirements as the general legalization program, 
but who can obtain special "blue cards" immediately and apply for 
permanent residence after five years (as opposed to twelve under the 
general program) if they continue working in agriculture, pay a fine, 
and show that they have paid their taxes.103 
The Senate Bill does more than provide a pathway for certain 
currently undocumented immigrants to legalize their immigration sta-
tus. It also restructures future flows, and in ways that diverge from 
the 1965 Act's civil rights ethos and commitment to opening doors to 
new, previously underrepresented or excluded populations. Many of 
the changes are welcomed by advocates for immigrants, particularly 
the ability of lawful permanent residents to apply for their own imme-
diate relatives (spouses and children) just as citizens can (instead of 
facing a multi-year backlog before visas are available, as is presently 
the case).104 The commitment to family unification, although defining 
"family" more narrowly now than in 1965, will continue to be a major 
source for future immigration flows. 
The interesting change comes from the emphasis, both rhetorical 
and legal, on the utility of future immigrants. Economic concerns 
have always been part of immigration history, but perhaps never more 
clearly, prominently and at the rhetorical forefront as with the current 
reforms, which share a vision of admitting people based upon their 
100. § 245D ("Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens who Entered the United States as 
Children"). 
101. § 245D(b )(l)(A)(i). 
102. § 245C(c)(5)(B). 
103. § 2211 ("Requirements for Blue Card Status"). 
104. America's Voice, a pro-immigrant advocacy organization cited thirty-two different pro-
visions as being positive in a blog post after passage of the Senate Bill. What We Won with 
Senate Bill S. 744, AMERICA'S VOICE (June 27, 2013), http://americasvoice.org!researchlwhat-we-
won-with-senate-immigration-bill-s-744/. 
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likelihood of contributing to the economy while not undercutting op-
portunities for citizens. The Senate Bill does this by creating a two-
track points-based architecture for "merit-based" immigration, each 
of which is divided into tiers. !Os For Track 1, which would comprise 
half of the merit-based immigrants, employment and education matter 
most.106 In descending order of importance, applicants receive points 
for years of employment experience in occupations that require "con-
siderable" or "extensive" preparation (i.e., high-skill) employment 
(up to twenty points),!07 and points for formal education (fifteen 
points for a doctorate, or ten points for a master's degree). Appli-
cants also receive points if currently employed in certain occupations 
or have a job offer in a high-demand occupation. Lower on the points 
scale are English language skills or having a U.S. sibling or parent, 
being young, coming from a nation that sends relatively few immi-
grants, and-least important-civic involvement (maximum of two 
points ).108 For the less-skilled Track 2 applicants, employment is far 
and away the most important criteria (maximum of forty points when 
exceptional employment records or employment in high-demand oc-
cupations are factored in). On this track, individuals can earn ten 
points for English language skills, for having a U.S. sibling or parent, 
and/or for being a caregiver tied behind that (maximum of ten points 
each).109 The Migration Policy Institute estimates that this would 
mean instead of six percent of immigrant visas going to skills-based 
applicants (or fourteen percent, if you include the accompanying fam-
ily members of those immigrants), sixteen to nineteen percent of im-
migrant visas would go to those applicants (or thirty-five to forty-one 
percent, if including family members)Yo Compared to other coun-
tries, this increase still keeps the U.S. fairly low in its reservation of 
105. See §§ 2301-02. 
106. § 2301(c)(4). 
107. § 2301(c)(9)(G), (H). 
108. As one pro-immigrant policy organization noted, "The message of this distribution is 
very clear: it prioritizes educated, experienced, skilled, English-fluent, young immigrants. The 
inclusion of family ties and diversity in this system, on the other hand, seems more like an extra 
bonus than an attribute that the system aims to embrace." AM. IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., 
DEFINING "DESIRABLE" IMMIGRANTS: WHAT LIES BENEATH THE PROPOSED MERIT-BASED 
POINT SYSTEM (May 20, 2013), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/defining-desirable-
immigrants-what-lies-beneath-proposed-merit-based-point-system. 
109. See § 2301(c)(5). 
110. Madeleine Sumption & Claire Bergeron, Remaking the US Green Card System: Legal 
Immigration under the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act of 2013, MIGRATION POL'y INST., June 2013, at 6. 
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visas for immigrants with particularly desired skills and employment 
contributions.ll1 
One way to make space for these changes without dramatically 
increasing overall immigration levels is the elimination of some ex-
isting immigrant flows. Two particular programs have historically 
drawn fire and were eliminated in the Senate Bill: the diversity visa 
and the sibling category for family-based immigration. First, the Sen-
ate Bill eliminates the diversity visa, the program described above 
from 1990, which intentionally formed a path for immigrants from his-
torically underrepresented nations, immigrants not likely to enter 
through employment or existing family tiesY2 Discussions in the 
House revealed the shift as a clear policy choice away from providing 
opportunity to random individuals dreaming of a new life in 
America-a common profile in American immigration mythology-
toward industry-specific needs. One House bill attempted to take the 
55,000 diversity visa slots and move them into visas for students grad-
uating from U.S. schools with various science, technology, engineering 
and math degrees.113 As House Republican leader Bob Goodlatte 
noted, "[t]he visa lottery, we think, is the best example that there is of 
how to issue green cards on a basis that has absolutely no correlation 
to what is in the interest of growing the American economy or family 
unification, because it does neither. It's based on pure luck."114 The 
randomness of the program-literally, a lottery program-sustains 
this kind of argument, but notably, diversity visa immigrants have, on 
average, higher educational and employment attainment than typical 
immigrants through the family-based immigration channels, and the 
program has been particularly effective at bringing educated African 
immigrants with managerial-level experience into the countryYs 
The second eliminated immigration pathway is that for siblings, 
currently the "fourth preference" in family-based permanent resident 
visas, after unmarried sons and daughters of citizens, is spouses and 
111. See id. 
112. See § 2303. 
113. H.R. 2131, 113th Congo (2013). 
114. Jennifer Martinez, Goodlatte and Issa Defend Cutting Diversity Visa Program, THE HILL 
(May 23, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://thehill.comlbiogslhillicon-valley/technoiogy/301605-goodiatte-
and-issa-defend-cutting-diversity-visa-program-in-tech-visa-bill. 
115. Arun Lobo, Unintended Consequences: Liberalized U.S. Immigration Law and the Afri-
can Brain Drain, in THE NEW AFRICAN DIASPORA TN NORTH AMERICA 203 (Kwado Konadu-
Agyemang et. aI, eds., 2006) ( quoted in Michael Kremer, The Diversity Visa Lottery: A Study 
Linking Immigration Politics to Immigrant Characteristics and Experiences (2011), available at 
dl. tufts.edulfile_assets/tufts: U A005.004.061.00001 (unpublished thesis, Tufts University». 
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children (below eighteen) of lawful permanent residents, and married 
sons and daughters of citizens.u6 (Spouses and minor children of citi-
zens are considered immediate relatives and do not need separate pe-
titions or visa numbers to be able to get permanent residence.)117 This 
category has been criticized as expanding too far the pool of people 
who can enter the U.S. already in the pipeline for citizenship, who can 
then petition for their circle of eligible family members, and so forth: 
for critics, "'chain migration' [is] a concept whose connotation is al-
most as poisonous as 'amnesty' among the bill's detractors.'>l18 Nota-
bly, the category has also been credited with bringing in many 
immigrants of color, especially from the Philippines, where the popu-
larity of the sibling-category visa has led to an infamous backlog of 
twenty years in visa availabilityY9 
The 1965 Act shifted the demographics of this country and per-
mitted less skilled and less educated people to come through family 
members and through slots for unskilled workers; reform today fo-
cuses on immigrants' likely economic contributions. This has at-
tracted a coalition of business interests who champion reform. 
Michael Bloomberg created the Partnership for a New American 
Economy in 2010, pushing for reform because of its likely economic 
impacts.12o Chamber of Commerce President Thomas J. Donahue 
makes similar arguments, noting that "America cannot compete and 
win in a global economy without the world's best talent, hardest work-
ers, or biggest dreamers. We cannot sustain vital programs for the 
elderly and needy without more workers-both low skilled and high 
skilled-to grow our economy and tax base."121 Technology sector 
leaders like Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg more recently created 
FWD.US to call for reform that establishes, among other things, "a 
streamlined process for admitting future workers to ensure that we 
116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 
117. See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
118. David Grant, Immigration Reform: When Is Family Reunification Also 'Chain Migra-
tion'?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 6, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.comlUSAlDC-De coderl 
2013/0506IImmigration-reform-When-is-family-reunification-also-chain-migrationl(page )/2. 
119. For the most recent length of wait for visas, see U.S. STATE DEP'T, VISA BULLETIN, 
available at http://travel.state.gov/visalbulletinlbulletin_1360.htrnl. 
120. See Marc LaVorgna, Mayor Bloomberg Discusses Need for Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform, CITY OF N.Y. OFFICIAL WEBSITE (July 26, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/257-13/mayor-bloomberg-need-comprehensive-immigration-reform. 
121. Reforming Immigration for a Better America, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Apr. 26, 2013) 
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continue to promote innovation and meet our workforce needs. "122 
In September 2013, a coalition of 100 business leaders from compa-
nies, including but well beyond the technology sector (such as Coca-
Cola, American Express, Johnson & Johnson, among others), sent a 
letter to House of Representatives leaders arguing that reform would 
be "a long overdue step toward aligning our nation's immigration pol-
icies with its work force needs at all skill levels to ensure U.S. global 
competitiveness. "123 
CONCLUSION: WHAT THESE CHANGES 
MASK AND SIGNIFY 
There are many reasons to applaud the innovations to the immi-
gration system, and during an era of recession, the shift to an empha-
sis on economic productivity and job-creation makes intuitive policy 
sense. It also provides a timely counter-narrative to the common ar-
gument against immigration, that it takes jobs away from Ameri-
cans-an argument with extra resonance during a recession. It sounds 
particularly good when accompanied by calls like those from Gates, 
Zuckerberg, and others, to improve the educational system in the 
U.S., to improve the competitiveness of U.S. citizens graduating with 
record levels of unemployment for jobs currently being filled by 
immigrants. 
My concern with basing reform on worthiness (the plan for the 
legalization of the undocumented) and utility (reforming future flows) 
is what such a shift both masks and signifies. First, what it masks: As 
this Symposium focuses on new civil rights challenges, I have been 
considering how far the current debates over immigration reform have 
come since the 1965 Act-the only law that explicitly attempted to set 
immigration law in a civil rights paradigm. As with other laws of the 
time, the 1965 Act was righting obvious and overt historical wrongs: 
the litany of race-based exclusions that run in a straight, bold line 
through the history of immigration law in the U.S. The frank ac-
knowledgment by leaders in 1965 of the racism in America's prior im-
migration law history is entirely absent from today's bill; in lieu of any 
122. FWD.us, http://www.fwd.us/immigration_reform (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
123. Letter from Coalition of 100 Business Leaders to John Boehner, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, (Sept. 
10, 2013), available at http://www.hrpolicy.orgldownloads/2013/CHRO_Immigration_Reform_ 
Letter.pdf; see also Julia Preston, Business Leaders Tell Lawmakers Not to Forget About Immi-
gration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept 10, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.coml2013/09/1OIbusi 
ness-leaders-tell-lawmakers-not-to-forget-about-immigrationl?J=O. 
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discussion of equality and removing barriers as values and pillars of 
immigration policy, the rhetoric and structure of the reforms suggest 
that utility is the new lodestar guiding reform. This is a plausible pol-
icy choice, but what I hope to convey today by contrasting reform with 
what happened in the height of the civil rights era, is that it is a choice, 
not an inevitability. 
Second, what the reforms signify: Reform that excludes millions 
creates significant new problems for those left out, the "super undocu-
mented" whose vulnerability to discrimination and exploitation will 
far exceed the already tremendous vulnerability of today's undocu-
mented population because they will be seen as even more culpable 
for their own lack of status. I fear that being undocumented the day 
after immigration reform will make being undocumented today look 
good by comparison. And three of the emerging problems-the de-
monization and blaming of those excluded; the increasingly pervasive 
focus on documentation; and society's abandonment of the notion of 
redemption-show us something about America more broadly, be-
yond the specific context of America's immigrants. 
I fear the narratives that will be told about immigrants who do 
not qualify for immigration reform. The narrative being created about 
immigration reform is that it is fixing the broken system, and solving 
the problem of the eleven million undocumented. As I have hopefully 
demonstrated today, with millions left out for varying reasons, reform 
does nothing of the kind-and those whose situation is not resolved 
are likely to be understood by the public as criminal because of the 
ongoing conflation of undocumented status with illegality and crimi-
nality. Undocumented immigrants already suffer this stigma, and 
those left out of reform will surely be perceived as even less worthy 
members of society. And although some will be excluded literally be-
cause of criminal convictions, the majority of those excluded are ex-
cluded because of poverty, lack of education, and lack of financial 
stability. In my earlier work, I have explored the problematic psycho-
logical power of narratives about immigrants, and how tales of unwor-
thiness in society seep into our laws and our courtrooms.124 In the 
new world post-reform, that power will be multiplied by the public's 
perception that this problem was already fixed-so those for whom 
the problem was not fixed must be deeply unworthy characters. 
124. See Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners, supra note 3. 
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The implications of such an attitude toward the new "super un-
documented" can only be known through time, but it is easy to imag-
ine that if undocumented workers face challenges accessing the courts 
now to file wage complaints against their employers-as they do in 
my experience litigating wage and hour claims in Maryland-such 
challenges will be worse when juries define the workers first and fore-
most as lawbreakers. If undocumented students-a highly sympa-
thetic portion of the undocumented population-now have access to 
higher education only through powerful grassroots organizing cam-
paigns like the extraordinarily effective Maryland DREAM cam-
paign,125 the ability of the "super undocumented" to access loans or 
maintain the ability to attend public institutions of higher education 
will be more difficult when the story shifts post-reform. 
As noted above, many of the reasons people will not qualify for 
reform flow not from personal failing but from poverty and lack of 
education. Yet the narrative of the "super undocumented" is unlikely 
to be anything other than accusatory: "you stayed undocumented be-
cause of your failings." Such accusations are sadly in line with attacks 
on the poor generally, from cutting food stamps to limiting unemploy-
ment benefits, all with the idea that such supports encourage laziness. 
As Charles Blow wrote recently in the New York Times: 
[S]omehow, when some poor people, or those who unexpectedly fall 
on hard times, take advantage of benefits for which they are eligible 
it's an indictment of the morality and character of the poor as a 
whole. The poor are easy to pick on. They are the great boogeymen 
and women, dragging us down, costing us money, gobbling up re-
sources .... We have gone from a war on poverty in this country to 
a war on the poor, in which poor people are routinely demonized 
and scapegoated and attacked .... 126 
Race and poverty intersect as a matter of reality and rhetoric 
alike, and as Peter Edelman has shown throughout his scholarship, the 
demonization of poor people as undeserving of benefits intersects too 
frequently with racial politics.127 Nothing in this conflation is new-
125. See Elizabeth Keyes, Examining Maryland's Views on Immigrants and Immigration, 43 
U. BALT. L.F. 1 (2012). 
126. Charles Blow, The Appalling Stance of Rand Paul, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.coml2013/12/12/opinionlblow-the-appalling-stance-of-rand-paul.html?ref=charles 
mblow&_r=O. 
127. Peter Edelman explores this persuasively by looking both at race as a proxy for "unde-
serving"-ness and exclusion of people of color from welfare rolls, and at race as a means of 
demonizing welfare programs generally. See Peter Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: 
Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 389 (2004). Of course, immi-
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political scientist Theda Skocpol has traced the line of deserving/unde-
serving in welfare back until the Civil War era-and I mention it here 
simply to remind us of its enduring power, and connect the blame 
likely to be assigned in the immigration context, disproportionately 
affecting immigrants of color-with the same phenomenon that has 
been a feature of the American political landscape in other contexts 
for so many decades. 
As the narrative deepens in its demonization of those who have 
"failed" to fix their status, it will conflate with the increasing centrality 
of documentation itself, in both the workplace and beyond. The Sen-
ate Bill creates a social security card that is "fraud-resistant, tamper-
resistant, wear-resistant, and identity theft-resistant,"128 and mandates 
the use of E_Verify,129 the federal database for employers to verify 
employment authorization. The only employment left for the millions 
of undocumented immigrants not included in immigration reform will 
be employment even deeper in the shadows than what is available 
now. Because such employment is rife with workplace abuse, any ad-
ditional barriers to emerging from the shadows to avail of courts for 
enforcement will permit such abuses to flourish. The day after immi-
gration reform, those who do not qualify for all the reasons I have 
described above will be without documents in a world that demands 
them even more than it does today. And as social security numbers 
become ever more central to daily life, used as a means of identifica-
tion far beyond the employment context,130 the absence of a card puts 
people at a significant disadvantage. 
The focus on documents as a way to separate "them" and "us" 
also mirrors a similar division created by voter ID laws, where the 
grants, themselves, were part of the group deemed undeserving in 1996, and even lawful perma-
nent residents were excluded from many public benefits following the passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Michael J. 
Wishnie, Welfare Reform After a Decade: Integration, Exclusion, and Immigration Federalism, in 
IMMIGRANTS AND WELFARE: THE IMPACf OF WELFARE REFORM ON AMERICA'S NEWCOMERS 
69, 69 (Michael E. Fix ed., 2009). 
128. S. 744, 113th Congo § 3102(a)(1). 
129. § 274A(d)(2)(G) ("Except as provided in subparagraph (H) [concerning tribal govern-
ment employers], not later than 4 years after regulations are published implementing this subsec-
tion, all employers shall participate in the System with respect to all newly hired employees and 
employees with expiring temporary employment authorization documents."). 
130. As the Congressional Research Service has noted, "In the view of some, a person's SSN 
has attained the status of a quasi-universal personal identification number. Today one can be 
required to furnish one's SSN to obtain a driver's license, apply for public assistance, donate 
blood, or take out a loan." KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., RL30318, THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ITs COLLECTION, DISCLOSURE, 
AND CONFIDENTIALITY (2008). 
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existence and availability of documentation is the dividing line be-
tween being able to vote or not. These laws are seen as disproportion-
ately affecting communities of color, as current Justice Department 
lawsuit against the North Carolina voter ID law alleges.l3l As Kevin 
Johnson argued with his "magic mirror" metaphor, this treatment of 
immigrants tells something about America more generally, where the 
centrality of documents is a way to further marginalize those at soci-
ety's edges, with disproportionate impacts on communities of color. 
Even for those in this population of super undocumented who are 
excluded because of crimes committed, the clear message of immigra-
tion reform is that, for them, there are no second chances. Among my 
own clients, some of the hopefulness about America that I have heard 
and felt most powerfully from my clients comes from those who came 
with the least but are working to help their children succeed, and 
among these, I count many who have amassed relatively minor crimi-
nal convictions, and one or two with more serious or lengthy criminal 
records whose turnaround has been extraordinary-but unforgivable 
in immigration terms. By excluding them from reform, we are saying 
that nothing they could do in the future would make up for the wrongs 
done in their past. I think of my client who fled Sudan who is thrilled 
to now be working at a difficult, dangerous job in a poultry factory in 
the South, or my client who finally laid the demons of drug abuse to 
rest and is raising her two young boys in rural Maryland with her part-
ner, and I find this societal abandonment of the idea of redemption 
short-sighted and deeply sad. 
And this says something about America more generally, where 
second chances are harder and harder to come by for immigrants and 
nonimmigrants alike. Expectations like these are higher for American 
citizens at society's margins as well, where mistakes (real or per-
ceived), can be the difference between liberty and deprivation of lib-
erty. Symptoms of this are all around: the mass incarceration of black 
men,132 and the often-permanent disenfranchisement of felons even 
after they have completed their sentencesp3 
131. Carrie Johnson, Justice Department Sues North Carolina over Voter ID Law, NPR 
(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.npr.orglblogs/thetwo-way/2013/09/30/227591062/justice-department-
to-sue-north-carolina-over-voter-id-Iaw. 
132. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2012). 
133. Jamin Raskin, Lawful Disenfranchisement: America's Structural Democracy Deficit, 32 
HUM. RTS. 12, 15 (2005) (examining the "democracy deficit" created by felon disenfranchise-
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In closing, I do celebrate the efforts to fix the broken system and 
to solve the intolerable situation of having eleven million members of 
our community living without legal status. But as we move slowly but 
surely forward toward reform, we must beware of creating a new set 
of even deeper problems for the future. As Erika James, the Howard 
Law Journal's Editor-in-Chief, said in her inspiring opening com-
ments this morning, we must "ensure that what is being done is just 
and what is just is done." Let immigration reform be done, and let us 
ensure that it is done justly. 
ment, ballot validation problems, and other measures that disproportionately impact African 
American and Hispanic voters). 
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